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Ever since a border has existed between the United States and Mexico,
there have been unique and substantial problems in enforcing the laws of both
countries in this border region. Because the border is so long, and largely
unpatrolled, it has served as a convenient escape route for fugitives from the
laws of both countries. What often complicates matters is the seemingly
inherent distrust that each country's government harbors for the other. Despite
vows of mutual cooperation in the law enforcement arena, both countries have
often refused requests for assistance ranging from extradition of fugitives to
giving the agents of one country temporary authority to operate in the other
country. Perhaps this mutual distrust can best be summed up as follows: the
Mexican government resents the United States for being a northern "bully"
who never compromises, and the United States characterizes the Mexican
system as being hopelessly corrupt.'
Although Mexico and the United States are particularly close trading
partners,2 the Mexican public views the United States as hypocritical when it
criticizes Mexican antidrug actions while remaining the largest illegal drug-
consuming nation in the world The recent money laundering sting by the
J.D. 2000, University of Georgia.
See Gary Martin, Drugs, Trade, Immigration on Clinton's Visit Agenda, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEWS, May 4, 1997, at 9A. But see Alan D. Bersin, El Tercer Pais: Reinventing the
United States/Mexico Border, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1418 (noting that bribery convictions of
United States border officials are not rare occurrences).
2 See Charles L. Davis, Mass Support for Regional Economic Integration: The Case of
NAFTA and the Mexican Public, 14 MEXICAN STUDIES 105 (1998), available in 1998 WL
13216107 (noting that nearly 70 percent of Mexican import and export trade in 1990 was with
the United States).
' See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the
North American Free TradeAgreement, 24 LAW&POL'YINT'LBUS. 391,392 (1993); Lawrence
L. Knutson, United States Sting Hurt Anti-Drug Effort, Mexico Says, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Dec. 16, 1998, at 20A; Mary Beth Sheridan, United States Censure Could Poison
Relations, Mexicans Warn Politics: Pressure Builds to 'Decertify' Nation as Ally in War on
Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997, at Al; Mark Fineman, Zedillo Vows to Fight for Dignity in
War on Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1997, at Al. But see Bersin, supra note 1, at 1413
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United States government, dubbed "Operation Casablanca," underscores the
intense divisiveness that still remains.
Money laundering is an indispensable element of organized crime.4
Without the ability to shift and conceal the vast amount of money derived
directly from illegal activity,5 large scale criminal activity could operate at
only a small fraction of current levels and with far less flexibility.6 Although
the world's financial networks have grown exponentially in both size and
complexity in the past few years, so has the scope of international money
laundering.7
This Note will attempt to gauge the legal and political effects of extraterri-
torial application of United States law enforcement in Operation Casablanca
under four areas of law: the United States anti-money laundering statute, the
United States Constitution, the United States-Mexico Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty, and principles of international law. Throughout, the Note will also
argue that although Operation Casablanca produced sensational results, the
United States could have avoided a foreign relations crisis if only it had
adhered to its international obligations.
II. HISTORY BEHIND THE PRESENT STATE OF
UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER RELATIONS
The United States and Mexico have unfortunately shared a rocky past when
it comes to transborder law enforcement cooperation. True to the image
portrayed in western movies (including the namesake of this Note), criminals
have for the last 150 years crossed the Rio Grande border with ease, often
avoiding prosecution by the applicable country's police. In return, such
transborder activity has offered a lucrative profit to smugglers and cattle
rustlers, safe havens for bandits, and economic hope for illegal migrant
(predicting that drugs may be the most debilitating feature of Mexican political life).
' See Andrew J. Camelio & Benjamin Pergament, Money Laundering, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 965, 966 (1998).
' In the case of Operation Casablanca, the illegal activity was drug trafficking.
6 See id. at 966.
' See William J. Olson, International Organized Crime: The Silent Threat to Sovereignty,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Fall 1997, at 65, 76. Mr. Olson also suggests that, while free trade
and "banking without borders" are necessary to our modem economic system, this global
system, due to its sheer size and complexity, has created a "haven for the unscrupulous," placing




workers Recently, the border has also been an easily exploitable asset for
drug traffickers and money launderers.9
Concerns of jurisdiction and state sovereignty often confound the
apprehension of transborder criminals.'0 The border is a fascinating area,
symbolizing the meeting point of two distinct cultures. However, law
enforcement officials usually regard the border as a serious obstacle to their
tasks." The border represents the limits of their jurisdiction and power; they
have no dominion over events across the border and are often dependent on the
authorities on the other side. 2
Tension over transborder law enforcement is nothing new. In 1824,
Mexico abolished slavery. 3 In 1825, to forestall an imminent flood of slaves
from Texas into Mexico, the United States offered to negotiate a treaty with
Mexico, which included a provision for the extradition of fugitive slaves. 4
However, slave owners in Texas often contacted Mexican military officials to
aid them in tracking runaway slaves, despite an 1857 provision in the Mexican
Constitution protecting fugitive slaves from extradition. 5
Another source of the uncooperative relationship between the two countries
was the seizure of Mexican territory as a result of the Mexican-American War
in the 1840s. 6 The combination of United States expansionism and the
conquest of half the Mexican territory by the United States set the stage for
future divisiveness.1 7 When political relations between the United States and
Mexico have gone awry, the relationships between local Mexican and United
States law enforcement agencies along the border have also suffered.'
' See Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico-United States Extradition and
Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers-150 Years and Beyond the Rio
Grande's Winding Courses, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 519, 522 (1997).
' See Bruce Zagaris & Jessica Resnick, The Mexico- United States Mutual LegalAssistance
in Criminal Matters Treaty: Another Step Toward the Harmonization of International Law
Enforcement, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14-15 (1997).
'o See id.; ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF UNITED STATES CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 62 (1993).
" See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 8, at 522.
12 See id.; NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 62.
13 See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 8, at 523.
14 This was a Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with Mexico. Id. Opposition
to the extradition clause resulted in its removal by the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Id.
IS See id. at 524.
16 See NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 62.
" See Bersin, supra note 1, at 1413.
8 See NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 62. The effect of political maneuvering on field
agents is a particular problem in the area of drug enforcement. See Philip True, Drug Sting Pact
Fails to Heal Rifts; Experts Say Operation Casablanca Has Left Lingering Controversies, SAN
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However, national political animosity has sometimes resulted in the cultivation
of informal, effective working relationships between these local law enforce-
ment agencies.' 9 Such cooperation might not be the result of any official
action, but rather is a consequence of the distance between the borderlands and
the capitals of both countries.2" This "frontier" mentality has come at the cost
of defying considerations of sovereignty.
After the United States Civil War concluded, the troubles on the border did
not end, as gangs of bandits used the border as an escape route. By this time,
Mexico and the United States had a formal extradition treaty in place.2'
However, a lack of cooperation between both countries resulted in officials on
both sides accusing each other of cooperation in cross-border criminality.22
It is not surprising that the usual response of United States law enforcement
agents was to take matters into their own hands and operate extraterritorially.
United States agents often ignored the requirement of formal permission, much
to the anger of the Mexican public.' Perhaps the most striking example of the
United States operating extraterritorially in Mexico was General John "Black
Jack" Pershing's 1916 expedition into Mexico to pursue Mexican outlaw
Pancho Villa who had raided New Mexico and killed United States citizens.24
Difficulty in transborder drug enforcement is also nothing new. Starting
in the Prohibition Era of the 1920s and 1930s, the United States cracked down
on the smuggling of alcohol into the United States from Mexico. When
prohibition was repealed in 1933,25 the emerging international character of
drug smuggling was becoming apparent.26 In an attempt to combat this
growing scourge, United States law enforcement officials once again operated
with impunity on Mexican soil, albeit covertly.27 Although negotiations did
occur between the United States and Mexican governments over the role of
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, July 4, 1998, at Al.
'9 See NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 62.
20 See id.
" The first formal extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States, concluded in
186 1, listed twelve extraditable crimes but provided that neither country would have to deliver
its own citizens to the other country. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 8, at 524-25.
'2 See id. at 525.
" See id.
24 See id. at 527. This was a direct order from President Woodrow Wilson. Although
Pershing was not able to directly apprehend Villa, secret agents employed by Pershing did
eventually poison and kill Villa. The end result of Pershing's military mission was to force
Villa's army deeper into Mexico, although the army still remained at large. See id.
2S See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
26 See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 8, at 529.
27 See Zagaris & Resnick, supra note 9, at 15; Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 8, at 529.
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these agents, the United States rejected any formal accord, under the belief that
it might curtail the freedom of these agents to operate.2"
In its early days of enforcing anti-narcotics law, United States agents
encountered a variety of problems, including corruption at all levels,
inadequate numbers to police the large border, and "sensitivity of both
governments... concerning the operations of freewheeling United States drug
enforcement agents south of the border."2 9 These same problems and attitudes
in transborder law enforcement are still prevalent over sixty years later.
III. OPERATION CASABLANCA
In November 1995, United States Customs Service (a branch of the United
States Department of the Treasury) agents in Los Angeles learned that
Mexican banks on the United States-Mexico border were being used by drug
traffickers of the infamous Juarez and Cali cartels to "wash" their cash.30
Without informing President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
or drug czar Barry McCaffrey,3 these agents set the wheels in motion for the
largest money-laundering sting in United States history. The three-year
operation involved more than two hundred undercover agents, and it is
estimated that the sting has resulted in almost 170 arrests and the confiscation
of a total of nearly one hundred million dollars in drug-related profits.32 On
May 18, 1998, the United States indicted twenty-two bank officials from
twelve of Mexico's largest banks for money laundering.33 The United States
government also froze sixty-eight million dollars from the institutional
accounts of twelve Mexican and two Venezuelan financial institutions.34 The
28 See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 8, at 529.
29 Id.
30 See Carol Rosenberg, Undercover Agents Break Huge Money-Laundering Ring (posted
May 18, 1998) <http://www.herald.com/herald/content/archive/news/americas/casablanca/docs/
009165.htm>.
31 See True, supra note 18, at Al.
32 See Antonio Fins & Oswaldo Zavala, Sting Sparks Feud Between Neighbors, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 9, 1998, at IF.
33 See Christopher Matthews, International Money Laundering: A National and Global
Priority, NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTY'S GEN. FIN. CRIMES REP., July, 1998, at 1. For a complete
listing of the indictment, see United States of Am. v. Victor Manuel Navarro (visited Apr. 17,
2000) <http://www.heraid.com/herald/content/archive/news/americas/casablanca/docs/
mexindict.htm> [hereinafter Indictment].
"' See Jane Bussey, 'Casablanca' Cash Fattened Many Miami Bank Accounts, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 1, 1998, <http://www.herald.com/herald/content/archive/news/americas/
casablanca/docs/064112.htm>.
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indictments directly charged Mexico's second and third-largest banks
(Bancomer and Banca Serfin, respectively) and Banca Confia, which had been
purchased by Citibank on May 11, 1998. 35
The scheme used by the agents in Operation Casablanca is fairly typical.36
First, United States Customs Service agents posed as drug sellers with money
to launder to representatives of the drug cartels. 3' The agents then deposited
these proceeds in Los Angeles banks, including Bank of America. The
United States banks wired the money to Mexican banks. Next, the Mexican
bankers who were part of the money-laundering scheme converted the money
into cashier's checks under fictitious names.39 At this point, the money
appeared to have a "clean" source: the Mexican bank, which skimmed 4 to 5
percent of the money for this service. ° Finally, these "legitimate" drafts were
either hand-carried or wired to members of the cartel in Mexico. 4' At this
point, the cartels could use the money without arousing any suspicion.
The United States agents, operating in Mexico at times, gradually gained
the confidence of both the bankers and the cartels.42 As this confidence grew,
" See id. This is not the only time in the past few years that Citibank has come under fire
for reputed connections to international money laundering. For a description of the investigation
of the Salinas-Citibank affair, which involved Raul Salinas de Gotari, brother of former Mexican
President Carlos Salinas de Gotari, see Mathew Paulose, Jr., Note, United States v. McDougald:
The Anathema to 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and National Efforts Against Money Laundering, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 253, 280-86 (1997). Cf Citi's Mexican Purchase Losing Market Share,
INT'L BANKINGREGULATOR, Sept. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4779907 (noting additional
details of the cumulative effects of Citibank's Mexican troubles).
" See generally David Rosenzweig, 4 to Testify in Cross-Border Money Laundering Case,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1999, at B 1 (describing a capsule summary of some of the machinations
behind Operation Casablanca).
3' See True, supra note 18, at IA.
3 See Joseph Finora, Money-laundering Arrests Hurt US-Mexican Relations, PRIVATE
BANKER INT'L, July 1998, at 8, 9.
" Incredibly enough, one Mexican banker's proposed strategy in handling any subsequent
money laundering investigation was to "act stupid." See Diane Lindquist, Sting Leaves a Mark:
Some Mexican Bankers Caught in U.S. Net, But Their New Law is Tougher Than Ours, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 29, 1998, at Cl.
40 See Matthews, supra note 33, at 1.
4' See Finora, supra note 38, at 9.
42 Incredibly enough, the United States Customs Service used the services of a former drug
dealer who had been involved in a plot to airlift 80 tons of cocaine into the United States. See
David Rosenzweig, Drug Witness SaysAgents NeverAskedAbout CriminalRecord, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1999, at BI [hereinafter Drug Witness]. This informant, the alleged nephew of a
Colombian drug lord with reported ties to the Cali drug cartel, has already received more than
$2.1 million for his services and may receive even more. See David Rosenzweig, Drug Money
Laundering Trial Underway, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at B3.
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the agents lured the Mexican bankers to a phony grand opening of a casino
outside of Las Vegas called Casablanca (hence the code name of the
operation).43 The agents claimed to have an interest in the casino, and they
represented it as an easy place to launder cash." Once the Mexican bankers
arrived, the trap was completed.
There was only one hitch with the apparent success of Operation Casa-
blanca. The United States Treasury Department did not inform the Mexican
government of its activities, which included sending agents posing as drug
traffickers into Mexico.45 The presence of United States law enforcement
agents in Mexican territory for the purpose of implementing United States
domestic law without the permission of the Mexican government raises serious
issues of United States respect for foreign sovereignty. While extraterritorial
jurisdiction is not, in and of itself, inconsistent with principles of territorial
sovereignty, extraterritorial enforcement of a country's law does go "to the
heart of political and economic independence and national sovereignty." 6
A. Latin American Reactions to Operation Casablanca
Casablanca has caused an uproar of disapproval from both the Mexican
government and media.47 Most seriously, the Mexican government is of the
opinion that United States law enforcement officers have violated Mexico's
national sovereignty.4
Casablanca effectively bound opposing Mexican political parties together
with the tie of anti-United States sentiment. Senator Mario Saucedo Perez of
the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) declared, "The problem of drug
trafficking is nothing more than a political pretext used by the United States
"' See Finora, supra note 38, at 10. These bankers were mostly mid-level managers from
banks located in the Mexican border state of Jalisco. See True, supra note 18, at IA.
See Finora, supra note 38, at 10.
4 See Eva Bertram & Kenneth Sharpe, The Drug War CorruptsA bsolutely, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
4, 1998, at M2.
"Extraterritorial Application of CriminalLaw, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 383,394-95
(1991) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Application] (remarks by Serge April, Bureau of Legal
Affairs, External Affairs and International Trade, Canada).
"" See Fins & Zavala, supra note 32, at IF. Mexican Senator Martha Lara, also president
of the Mexican Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, said, "To infiltrate an agent (in Mexico) can
only be done with direct authorization from the attorney general of Mexico.... United States
Customs did not comply with this law." Id. She also has demanded that the United States
Customs agents involved in Casablanca be arrested if they set foot in Mexico. See id.
"" See Finora, supra note 38, at 8.
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government to involve themselves in our internal affairs. 4 9 Deputy Javier
Corral Jurado of the National Action Party said that the Casablanca indict-
ments were "proof of a unilateral, deceitful, and disloyal relationship."5
The Mexican government also demanded the extradition of the United
States agents who violated Mexican law during the sting." Recently however,
the Mexican Attorney General's office concluded that it was not able to obtain
the evidence needed to press charges against the United States agents. 2 In
addition to the complaints of sovereignty violations, sting operations are
considered a form of entrapment by Mexican law and are illegal.5 3 Mexican
President Ernesto Zedillo formally protested to both the United Nations and
to the United States, declaring that Operation Casablanca violated Mexican
law and United States-Mexican cooperation agreements.5 4 Mexican Foreign
Secretary Rosario Green noted that United States citizens need to learn that
legal boundaries exist in other countries that are as solid as their own and that
these boundaries should be respected." Ironically, while Operation Casa-
blanca unfolded, the Mexican government was in the process of implementing
new, tough anti-money laundering rules. 6 Furthermore, perhaps in retaliation
for United States lack of respect for Mexican sovereignty, the Mexican
government denied a United States request for extradition of five individuals
connected to Operation Casablanca. 7
9 Andrew Wainer, April-June, THENEWS, Dec. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22724764.
50 Id.
51 See 11 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 8, June 1998, at 8.
52 See Embassy of Mexico Press Release, Government of Mexico Announces Decision on
"Operation Casablanca" (issued Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.embassyofmexico.org/english/l/
4/Press_1999/BOL-99-l7.htm>.
" See Fallout From Operation Casablanca, THENEWS, June 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL
7319302. Mexico's criminal code makes it a felony to conduct operations with illegally
obtained goods or proceeds. See Embassy of Mexico Press Release, supra note 52.
54 See MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., supra note 51, at 8; True, supra note 18, at AI (noting
that Mexican Foreign Minister Rosario Green informed Secretary of State Albright that
President Zedillo had ordered an investigation of illegal activities).
" See Fallout From Operation Casablanca, supra note 53. Secretary Green also declared
that "we have to educate [the United States]; probably it will take a lot of time, but I believe that
we have to keep trying." Id.
s' See Lindquist, supra note 39, at CI (noting that experts predict the new Mexican banking
rules, once fully implemented, may be even stricter than the United States law). The Mexican
Congress is considering legislation that would close loopholes in investigations involving
illegally obtained goods or proceeds. See Embassy of Mexico Press Release, supra note 52.
5' These individuals will be tried in Mexico. See id. The Secretariat of Foreign Relations
based this denial in part on the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty. See id.
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The outrage in other Latin American countries has been similar. In
Venezuela, where two financial institutions were affected by Operation
Casablanca, the government declared that it will seek to prosecute the United
States agents for violations of its laws.5" One of the Venezuelan banks, Banco
Industrial de Venezuela, has filed suit in United States federal court for the
four million dollars it allegedly lost during the undercover operation." The
Venezuelan ambassador said his country is "so angry with the United States
that it will prosecute" the undercover United States agents and that "[Vene-
zuela] can now state that the [agents] ... broke Venezuelan laws and will be
prosecuted accordingly. ' ' 0 Cuba has characterized Operation Casablanca as
"particularly target[ing] Mexico and Venezuela without the knowledge or
cooperation of those countries' authorities."'
B. United States Reaction to Operation Casablanca
The sting has been widely praised by United States government officials
and by money laundering experts.62 United States Attorney General Janet
Reno triumphantly declared, "Today is a very bad day for drug dealers in the
Hemisphere. 63 Similarly, members of both the Republican and Democratic
political parties commended the actions of the United States agents.6 Senator
Diane Feinstein also wholeheartedly endorsed this action in the wake of a
58 See James Morrison, Venezuela's Complaints, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1998, at A13.
59 See Latin American Briefs, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Dec. 23, 1998, available in 1998
WL 25272957.
o Morrison, supra note 58, at A13.
61 Mexican Foreign Minister Rosario Green Wraps Up Two-day Official Visit to the Island,
CUBANEWS FROM RADIO HAVANA CUBA (visited Nov. 19, 1998) <http://www.radiohc.org/
Distributions/RadioHavanaEnglish/. 1998/98jun/rhc-eng-06.24.98>.
62 Former United States Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin said, "Today, we have hurt the
drug cartels where it hurts the most-in their pocketbooks." Fins & Zavala, supra note 32, at
IF. Jeffrey Robinson, author of THE LAUNDRYMEN, a study of money-laundering probes,
declared," 'Casablanca sent a serious message to the (drug dealers) in Mexico and (in the U.S.).
... It was a home run.'" Id.
63 See Rosenberg, supra note 30.
See generally 144 CONG. REC. S5463 (daily ed. May 22, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (thanking Secretary Rubin, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement Ray
Kelly, and the undercover agents for their work in establishing "this necessary beachhead in the
war on drugs").
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perceived inability of the Mexican government to police its- own financial
institutions.65
To further complicate matters, many United States politicians have treated
the Mexican reaction as a deep disappointment.' This congressional attitude
even extended to a'personal rebuke of Mexican Foreign Secretary Green's
request for extradition as "intemperate rhetoric. 67  Furthermore, in an
uncharacteristic display of solidarity, the United States Congress passed a
near-unanimous rejoinder to President Zedillo, endorsing Operation Casa-
blanca and rejecting the Mexican claims for extradition.68  The general
congressional mood was summed up by Representative Bachus: "The war on
drugs will always be stymied if we put our diplomatic concerns first and let
drug dealers continuously hide behind national borders. '69 The House of
Representatives passed the Bachus resolution, declaring official congressional
support for Operation Casablanca and refusing to support extradition of the
agents to Mexico.70
However, even in the United States, reactions have not been entirely pro-
Casablanca. Secretary of State Albright, originally expressing praise for the
operation, altered her position when she discovered the lack of communication
between the two countries.7" Drug czar McCaffrey has admitted mistakes in
65 See id. (noting that "[d]espite Mexico's lax enforcement of its own money-laundering
statutes, it is good to see that the United States is not afraid to use its own resources to address
this serious problem").
" See True, supra note 18, at Al. The reaction came in the form of a May 26, 1998,
response letter from Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott to President Zedillo; see also 144 CONG.
REC. S5464, supra note 64 (expressing the hope that Casablanca would spur tougher Mexican
enforcement of its anti-money-laundering statutes, "rather than the erratic and insufficient
cooperation we have seen until now").
67 See 144 CONG. REc. S6011 (daily ed. June 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
6 See True, supra note 18, at Al. For the official press release of Representative Spencer
Bachus, who authored the resolution, see Bachus to Introduce Resolution Supporting United
States CustomsAgents Involved in Operation Casablanca (visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.
house.gov/banking/6998bac.htm> [hereinafter Bachus Press Release]. The actual vote of the
United States House was 404-3 in favor of a non-binding resolution supporting Casablanca. See
Mexican Congressmen Angered by United States, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, June 23, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6685307.
69 Bachus Press Release, supra note 68.
70 See 144 CONG. REC. H4892 (daily ed. June 22, 1998) (presentation of the resolution as
H. Con. Res. 288).
71 Secretary Albright issued a letter to Treasury Secretary Rubin suggesting that "[w]e might
have achieved more favorable results if we had brought [Mexican] Attorney General Madrazo
and a few others into our confidence a few days before the public announcement." This letter
was reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. S6012 (daily ed. June 10, 1998). Furthermore, Secretary
Albright declared that she "would appreciate being kept personally informed of developing
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the handling of the operation.72 When the operation failed to receive the
continuing support of Secretary Albright, members of Congress expressed
intense disapproval of her new position. a Secretary Albright has since
retreated somewhat, labeling any further pursuit by Mexico to extradite the
agents as "counterproductive. 74
Since then, the two countries have pledged to keep each other fully
informed about sensitive law enforcement activities to avoid further damage
to relations between the two countries. 75 Attorneys General Reno and Madrazo
Cuellar introduced a program that would train law enforcement officials from
both countries in proper investigative techniques.76 However, this posturing
has been viewed with skepticism.77
Supporters of Operation Casablanca label the Treasury Department's
secrecy as necessary for the safety of the undercover agents and for the success
of the operation. 7' This reveals a deep distrust by United States agents of the
infamous (and possibly exaggerated, in this case) corruption of the Mexican
government, even in light of much recent successful cooperation between
investigations in Mexico ... that could have a significant foreign policy fallout." Id.
72 See Wainer, supra note 49. McCaffrey said that the United States may have been
"inadequetly [sic] sensitive" in the handling of Casablanca. Id.
" For a nutshell of the basic American position, see generally 144 CONG. REC., supra note
67, at S6011 (statement of Sen. Grassley). Senator Grassley reasons that United States Customs
agents closed the most successful undercover operation in history. According to Grassley, the
operation took down a gang of "drug thugs" who violated United States, Mexican, and
international law by laundering illegal drug money, thus "abetting one of the nastiest businesses
on the planet" to make "an illegal dollar." Id. Clearly, what puzzled United States lawmakers
was the Mexican reaction. "Instead ofjoining hands in congratulating efforts... [t]he Foreign
Minister of Mexico has called the law enforcement people the criminals ... [and] called for
[their] extradition.. ., claiming they have violated Mexican law." Id.
4 See Bachus Encouraged by Albright Statements Concerning Extradition of United States
Agents Involved in Operation Casablanca, Gov't Press Releases, June 12, 1998, available in
1998 WL 7324383.
"' See Norman Kempster, United States, Mexico Vow Better Communication, L.A. TIMES,
July 3, 1998, at A4.
76 See Lara Becker, Madrazo, Reno Announce BinationalAnti-DrugEffort, THE NEwS, Nov.
11, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22724620. Madrazo Cuellar and Reno have even agreed to
install a hotline between their two offices to offer advance notice of sensitive transborder
activities. However, even this gesture comes with a caveat: notification would not be required
if disclosure might threaten the lives of undercover agents. See Kempster, supra note 75, at A4.
7' Larry Bims, director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, states that this does not solve
the true problem: the unwillingness of Mexican officials to use the law as a weapon to fight drug
trafficking. "There is absolutely no grounds for optimism that this will be any different from
what it was before." Becker, supra note 76.
71 See True, supra note 18, at AI.
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United States and Mexican law enforcement officials.79 For example, 1997
was a banner year for extradition of fugitives from Mexico to the United
States, with a record twenty-three fugitives returned from Mexico to the
United States.8" Law enforcers from both countries have collaborated to
prosecute members of a San Diego gang with ties to the Arellano-Felix
Mexican drug cartel."' Furthermore, despite the Operation Casablanca fiasco,
United States Customs agents have since been authorized to operate in Mexico
for the purpose of collecting anti-narcotics information. 2 Although the final
legal outcome of Operation Casablanca in the United States court system is
unclear, 3 what is clear is that the success of Operation Casablanca has come
at the price of a further decline in United States-Mexican relations.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL DANGERS OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Money laundering is "the financial process by which one conceals the
existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and disguises that
income to make it appear legitimate."" In simpler terms, it transforms "dirty"
drug money into "clean" money that is commercially usable by the drug
cartels.85 In spite of the technological advances in law enforcement, it is
relatively easy for organized crime to launder its money.
6
9 See id. (quoting William Walker, Latin American drug enforcement analyst at Florida
International University: "If Mexican authorities still cannot be trusted after decades of work on
binational drug-enforcement policies, when will they ever be trustworthy?").
go See Kempster, supra note 75, at A4.
8' See id.
82 See US. Customs Takes Drug Fight Into Mexico, THE NEWS, Mar. 16, 2000, available
in 2000 WL 3887823. Additionally, the Mexican government has authorized 45 United States
Drug Enforcement Agency agents to operate in Mexico. See id.
83 The case is being heard in the United States Federal District Court for the Central District
of California as United States v. Alcala Navarro. See Indictment, supra note 33. Victor Manuel
Alcala Navarro (also known as Dr. Navarro) is accused of directing the entire money laundering
operation in Mexico. See Rosenzweig, supra note 36, at B1.
4 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7, 20 (1984). For some of the signals of a possible
ongoing money laundering operation, see Andrew P. Doppelt, The Telltale Signs of Money
Laundering, 169 J. ACCT. 31, 32-33 (1990).
"5 For a brief overview of the life cycle of money laundering, see Bruce Zagaris, A Brave
New World: Recent Developments in Anti-Money Laundering andRelated Litigation Traps For
The Unwary in International Trust Matters, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1023, 1027-28 (1999).
86 See id. at 1090.
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Money laundering is, to say the least, a massive problem. According to the
United Nations (UN), money launderers process between one hundred billion
and five hundred billion dollars each year. 7 It is a problem worldwide in
scope, although some of the best-known safe havens for money launderers are
in the Western Hemisphere.8 Annual drug proceeds from the United States
alone have been estimated at 40 billion to 60 billion dollars.8 9 This is much
greater than the total revenues of Colombia ($16 billion), Bolivia ($3.7
billion), and Peru ($2 billion) combined.' This means that illegal drug
operations actually have more resources at their disposal than the governments
of many drug-producing countries. Often these resources are utilized to
compromise the integrity of these governments.9
V. THE UNITED STATES ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTE
The United States Congress decided to try to hit international criminals in
their pocketbooks by enacting the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.92
It has been widely recognized as one of the most stringent anti-money
laundering initiatives in the world.9' The act combines a very broad knowl-
edge requirement with an extraterritorial jurisdictional element.
A. Liability under the Act
First, a person or financial institution can be liable if, knowing that "the
property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds" from
illegal activity, that person tries to conduct a financial transaction involving
87 See Konstantin D. Magliveras, Defeating the Money Launderer: The International and
European Framework, 1992 J. Bus. L. 161, 161 (1992).
" See OAS Unit Proposes Money Laundering, Forfeiture Laws, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, Apr. 1991, at 1,
*' See Matthews, supra note 33, at 1.
"See Olson, supra note 7, at 73.
9' See id. It is sometimes said that the drug cartels try to "bribe government officials, hire
thugs to intimidate those that cannot be bought, and kill those that cannot be intimidated." Id.
92 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 726, 110 Stat. 1214, 1301-02 (1996) [hereinafter the Act].
93 See John L. Evans, International Money Laundering: Enforcement Challenges and
Opportunities, 3 Sw. J.L. &TRADE AM. 195,212 (1996) (noting that the strengthening of United
States money laundering laws has resulted in conviction of several high ranking members of
criminal organizations).
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the illegal property.94 The act also extends liability to anyone who attempts to
transfer, transport, or transmit funds to or from the United States if that person
has the intent of carrying on illegal activity or the knowledge that the property
involved in the transaction was produced by illegal means.9"
Furthermore, and most relevant to the facts of Operation Casablanca, the
act allows for the use of "sting" operations. Liability attaches if a person, with
the intent to carry on or conceal proceeds from an illegal activity, attempts to
conduct a financial transaction involving property represented by a law
enforcement officer (or someone with the approval of such an officer) "to be
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity."96 Thus, the act authorizes the use
of informants as well as actual law enforcement officials.97
The transaction (or series of transactions) must also exceed $10,000.98 This
$10,000 requirement is important because, under the Banking Secrecy Act,9
financial institutions are required to report all cash transactions over $10,000
directly to the Secretary of the Treasury.'0 Any attempt to avoid the reporting
requirement through physically transporting amounts of money less than
$10,000 ("smurfing") is a crime.''
The act also allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction. There is extraterritorial
jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by the act (money laundering) if "the
conduct is by a United States citizen, or, in the case of a non-United States
citizen, the conduct occurs inpart in the United States."'0 2 Although there is
always a concern of intruding upon another state's sovereignty when a law is
applied extraterritorially, it is well-established United States practice to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the authority of the United States Constitu-
tion. 3 What should immediately give rise to concern is that although the act
94 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).9' Id. § 1956 (a)(2).
9 Id. § 1956 (a)(3).
" See Camelio & Pergament, supra note 4, at 970.
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
" Banking Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5311-5314,5316-5322 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998)
[hereinafter BSA], Annuzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of October 28, 1992, Pub. L
No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4044-4074 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A., 18
U.S.C.A., & 31 U.S.C.A. (West 1998)).
'00 See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a); 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a); 31 C.F.R. 103.22(a), (b)(1) (1998).
"03 See 31 C.F.R. 103.23(a),(b) (1998). See generally Michael Zeldin & Amy G. Rudnick,
Money Laundering: Next Frontier, Bus. CRIMES BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LITIG., Dec. 1997, at
7 (providing an overview of the role of smurfing in money laundering operations).
'02 18 U.S.C. § 1956(0(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
0'3 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, United States LawEnforcementAbroad" The Constitution and
International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880, 892 (1989) [hereinafter Lowenfeld I]; United States
v. Bowman, 280 U.S. 94 (1922); see also Bruce Zagaris & David R. Stepp, Criminal and Quasi-
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provides for extraterritorial application, it does not specify any guidelines for
such application and enforcement. Especially troubling is the fact that the act
indiscriminately extends United States jurisdiction to foreign financial
institutions. '"
At first blush it might appear that it is against common sense to hold an
entire financial institution liable for the actions of a few guilty money
launderers within its ranks. However, under the "collective knowledge"
theory, a corporation is deemed "to know everything known by all its
employees."'0 5 In this respect, United States corporate criminal liability law
is the broadest in the world.16
B. The Act As Applied to Operation Casablanca
Presently, thirty-one people have pleaded guilty even before going to
trial.'07 Sixty of the one hundred individuals remain fugitives.08 Those found
guilty face a maximum of twenty years in prison and a fine of $500,000 or
more."° Although some defendants have been acquitted, one Mexican
businessman was sentenced to over seven years in a United States federal
prison. "0 Several other defendants convicted of money laundering under the
Criminal Customs Enforcement Among the United States, Canada, and Mexico, 2 IND. INT'L &
CoN. L. REV. 337, 338 (1992) (noting that the United States asserts extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction on five traditional bases: territorial, protective, nationality, universal, and passive
personality).
'0' 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The act is designed to apply to
"whoever," a word not limited to individuals and intended to be as broad as it must be to ensnare
financial institutions as well. The act makes explicit reference to conviction of financial
institutions. Id. § 1956(g).
" Kirk W. Munroe, Surviving the Solution: The Extraterritorial Reach ofthe United States,
14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 505, 512 (1996). Ironically, situations have arisen in which a bank was
found guilty, but the individual employees who committed the criminal acts were set free. Id.
(citing United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987)).
' See Munroe, supra note 105, at 512.
107 See David Rosenzweig, 3 Convicted of Laundering Drug Money, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1999, at BI.
'o See id.
'o This is the maximum punishment under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998). The maximum fine is either $500,000 or twice the value of the funds involved
in the illegal transaction, whichever is greater. Thus, the Casablanca defendants could face fines
greater than $500,000. See id.; Rosenzweig, supra note 36, at BI.
"0 See Businessman Gets 7 Years in Money Laundering, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1999, at B6.
The harshness of this sentence was likely influenced by the judge's suspicion that this particular
defendant had lied while being examined at trial. See id.
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act face terms of eight to ten years in federal prison."' Two of the Mexican
banks, Bancomer and Banca Serfin, pleaded guilty.11 2 Each bank will pay a
criminal fine of $500,000 and will forfeit millions of dollars in money seized
during Operation Casablanca."' The third bank defendant, Banca Confia,
agreed to forfeit over twelve million dollars in exchange for dismissal of
criminal charges.114 The apparent key to the United States government's
success was a hidden video that captured admissions by the various defendants
of their knowing participation in an illegal money laundering operation." 5
VI. How OPERATION CASABLANCA WENT WRONG
Does the defendants' conduct justify extraterritorial application of the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986? When one confines the analysis to
the black letter of the statute, it certainly seems to. Especially convincing is
that cross-border money laundering is exactly the type of conduct that the
United States Congress was seeking to crack down on in enacting the act.
However, extraterritorial provisions in criminal statutes contemplate
international cooperation in enforcing these laws. There are certain rules that
the United States should follow in applying its laws extraterritorially. First,
the United States Constitution and domestic federal law should be adhered to.
Second, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty exists for exactly this type of law
enforcement opportunity and should be utilized. Third, principles of
international law should be followed.
A. The Role of the United States Constitution and United States Domestic Law
The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the United States, and
it mandates that treaties entered into under federal auspices hold a position of
.' See Rosenzweig, supra note 107, at BI.
12 See Mexico's Bancomer, Serfin Plead Guilty to MoneyLaundering, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3 1,
1999, at C22 [hereinafter WALL ST. J.].
11' Bancomer will forfeit over $9.4 million, and Banca Serfin will forfeit approximately $4.2
million. See id. Banca Serfin decided that it was a better business decision to plead guilty rather
than risk further potential loss of money and reputation through a court battle. See Mexican
Banks Plead Guilty, INT'L BANKING REG., Apr. 5, 1999, at 1.
"4 See WALL ST. J., supra note 112, at C22.
"' See Drug Witness, supra note 42, at B I. The video admissions satisfied the knowledge
requirement of the act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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authority on the same level as federally enacted laws." 6 The agents involved
in Casablanca were operating under the authority of the United States.
Therefore, their conduct was governed by the United States Constitution, any
applicable treaties, and federal law." 7 One treaty that bears directly on the
Casablanca situation is the Mexico-United States Mutual Legal Assistance
Cooperation Treaty.'
Furthermore, if United States law enforcement officers act in a foreign state
(like Mexico), they must observe the laws of that state."19 Somewhat
surprising, given the widespread congressional support for Operation
Casablanca, is that historically Congress has been very cautious about
extraterritorial law enforcement. In 1976, Congress even amended the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 to reflect its antipathy to anti-drug police operations
in foreign countries. 20 This statute declares that "[n]o officer or employee of
the United States may directly effect an arrest in any foreign country as part
of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control efforts, not
withstanding any other provision of law.''
It is very peculiar that Congress chose to single out the "war on drugs" as
an area to restrict extraterritorial action. The Senate, in its report on this
amendment, explained:
116 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made... under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.") (emphasis added).
"7 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, United States LawEnforcementAbroad: The Constitution and
International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 451 (1990) [hereinafter Lowenfeld II].
"8 Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, Dec. 9, 1987, United States-Mexico, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 100-13, 27 I.L.M. 443 (1988) [hereinafter MLAT]. For the bulk of the
discussion of the MLAT's applicability to Operation Casablanca, see infra notes 124-145 and
accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
433(1)(b) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; Lowenfeld II, supra note 117, at 451.
Lowenfeld frames the issue as whether United States officers may act in a foreign state free from
the restraints of United States law, including, of course, the Constitution. Id. at 458; see also
Mark Gibney, Policing the World. The Long Reach of United States Law and the Short Arm of
the Constitution, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103, 103-05 (1990) (exploring the growing international-
ization of United States law enforcement and the apparently scant protection that the
Constitution offers).
120 See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 48 1(c), Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 452 (codified as
amended 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)), as enacted by International Security
Assistant and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 § 504(b), Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 764.
This amendment was a reaction to United States Drug Enforcement Agency agents operating in
Thailand. See Lowenfeld II, supra note 17, at 477-78.
121 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). This is the 1994 text of the statute.
Aside from some very minor changes, it has existed in virtually the same form since 1976.
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In adopting this restriction, the Committee seeks to reconcile
two important U.S. interests: motivating foreign governments
to cooperate to the fullest degree in stopping drugs from
reaching the U.S. and avoiding excessive U.S. intervention in
the internal affairs of other nations. The range of actions
carried out by U.S. narcotics agents overseas covers a wide
spectrum-from the innocuous (exchanging information and
intelligence) to the clearly objectionable (actions involving
the use of force and actions involving the arrest of foreign
nationals).
It is the Committee's intent the "police action," as used in
this provision, is meant to prohibit U.S. narcotics agents
abroad from engaging in actions involving the use of force
and actions involving the arrest of foreign nationals-whether
unilaterally (acting on their own) or as members of teams
involving agents or officials of other foreign governments.
And more broadly, it is the Committee's intent that the Drug
Enforcement Administration and Chiefs of U.S. diplomatic
missions overseas exercise special care to insure that U.S.
narcotics agents overseas not engage in any types of actions
in which there is a reasonable risk of embroiling the United
States in the internal affairs of other countries by tending to
lead them into situations involving the use of force or the
arrest of foreign nationals."2
More recently, in 1986, Congress reiterated its stance:
The committee continues to believe that [the amendment to
§ 481(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act] inhibits the
ability of United States officials, particularly DEA agents, to
carry out their duties overseas. However, the committee also
recognizes that the presence of U.S. officials at narcotics
arrest actions can be a sensitive political issue which may
have an impact on bilateral relations. "
12 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS
EXPORT CONTROL ACT, S. REP. No. 94-605, at 55 (1976).
123 HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONALNARCOTICS CONTROL ACTOF 1986,
REPORT ON H.R. 5352, H.R. REP. No. 798 (1986).
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Even in 1986 there was, ironically, a divided federal reaction to extraterritorial
law enforcement operations similar to the tension that arose between the
United States State Department and Congress regarding Operation Casablanca.
In the spring of 1986, President Reagan signed a "secret" National Security
Decision Directive declaring that international drug trafficking was a matter
of national security and authorizing the use of military personnel in foreign
anti-drug campaigns. 24 The often-present dichotomy between congressional
and executive policies is disturbing, given the fact that the same principles of
law apply to both branches. However, it remains that the official congressio-
nal stance is not one of extraterritorial law enforcement, but rather one which
emphasizes assistance and international cooperation.'
25
Although the Casablanca agents were not narcotics agents per se, the
campaign on money laundering is inseparable from the war on drugs. Given
the seeming about-face in congressional conduct, it is unclear if we are
witnessing a sea change in United States extraterritorial law enforcement
policy.
B. Effect of Mexico-United States Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation
Treaty
A recent trend in international law enforcement is the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty, or MLAT. Mutual legal assistance is one of the formal
processes for obtaining evidence from abroad for use in United States
proceedings.' 26 Some of the circumstances for the use of these formal requests
for mutual legal assistance include: when a prosecutor wishes to compel the
testimony of a witness located abroad, production of documents located
abroad, and, of most pertinence to Casablanca, search and seizure of evidence
abroad and freezing of overseas assets. 21 MLATs are replacing the unwieldyformer system of letters rogatory. The reasons that the letters rogatory system
124 See Gibney, supra note 119, at 105-06.
'2' See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(1)(D-G) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The extent of United States
involvement in the fight against money laundering in other countries is, by statute, limited to
ensuring that other countries adopt their own stringent domestic anti-money laundering
measures. See id. § 2291(a)(1)(F).
"6 See Extraterritorial Application, supra note 46, at 392 (remarks by Lisa Cacheris, Office
of International Affairs, Criminal Division, United States Dep't of Justice).
127 See id. at 392.
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is being abandoned are that it can be extremely time-consuming and it is only
available post-indictment. 2 '
In contrast, MLATs can be used pre-indictment to acquire grand-jury
investigation-type evidence. 29  For example, an MLAT can enable the
prosecution to gain access to copies of a defendant's foreign bank records. 3
MLAT requests do not require a court order; rather, the head of a prosecuting
entity in one country sends the request directly to his or her counterpart in the
foreign country for execution.'
3
'
By cutting out many time-consuming steps required under the letters
rogatory process, the MLAT process has greatly streamlined foreign law
enforcement cooperation.3 2 One final advantage is that, unlike an executive
agreement, an MLAT is a treaty and thus has a much broader scope of
effect. 33
The Mexican Senate approved the MLAT on December 29, 1987, '34 but it
was not entered into force by the United States until May 3, 1991. 3 There
was a surprising wave of opposition to the ratification of the MLAT led by
Senator Jesse Helms, who was concerned about drug-related corruption in
Mexico and the potential for corrupt Mexican officials taking advantage of
their right to request information. 36  Another problem was anti-Mexican
sentiment in the United States government due to the assassination of a United
'2 See id. Letters rogatory have sometimes been called "the black hole of evidence
gathering." Id. It involves a request from a United States court to a foreign court for whatever
assistance is sought. The United States Department of Justice then reviews the request and sends
it to the State Department, which sends it through diplomatic channels to the foreign
government, where it is presented to the foreign court. In the meantime, the prosecution must
wait while the foreign government acts on the request and the evidence slowly winds its way
back to the United States through the same diplomatic channels. Id.
129 See id. at 393.
130 See Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 102 (1997) (answers of the United States State
Department to questions by Sen. Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, on how MLATs will aid United States law enforcement).
,32 See Extraterritorial Application, supra note 46, at 393.
32 See id.
133 See id.
'34 See MLAT, supra note 118, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13 at iii, 27 I.L.M. at 445. The
Mexican ratification process was rather routine, despite traditional Mexican concerns over
potential infringements of its sovereignty. See Zagaris & Resnick, supra note 9, at 19.
3 See NADELMANN, supra note 10, at 384.
116 See Zagaris & Resnick, supra note 9, at 20-21.
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States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, Enrique Camarena, in
Mexico.'37
The purpose of the Mexico-United States MLAT is to more effectively
counter transborder criminal activities, including such "modem criminals" as
drug cartels, white collar criminals, and terrorists. 3 The MLAT provides for
a broad range of cooperation in criminal matters, including the execution of
requests for searches and seizures and the taking of measures to immobilize,
secure, or forfeit assets and instrumentalities of crime.'39
The foundation of the United States-Mexico MLAT is cooperation between
countries in order to prevent, investigate, and prosecute crimes through
requests for mutual legal assistance. 4 It explicitly "does not empower one
Party's authorities to undertake, in the territorial jurisdiction of the other, the
exercise and performance of the functions or authority exclusively entrusted
to the authorities of that other Party by its national laws or regulations."''
Furthermore, the MLAT expressly facilitates assistance for the very sort of
situation that Casablanca concerned: the immobilization, seizure, and
forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. 42 To effect the overall goals of coopera-
tion and communication, the parties are required to meet at least once every
two years to review and improve the effectiveness of the MLAT. 43
The meetings apparently envisioned by the MLAT drafters have occurred,
but unfortunately the most recent were in the wake of the Casablanca fiasco.
137 The DEA believed that Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen, was behind
the torture and killing of Camarena. It negotiated with the Mexican government to extradite
Alvarez-Machain to the United States. When these negotiations failed to secure Alvarez-
Machain's extradition, the DEA abducted Alvarez-Machain from Guadalajara, Mexico, to El
Paso, Texas, in order for him to stand trial in the United States. This action caused an
international outcry. The case made its way to the United States Supreme Court. See United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). For the argument that hemispheric
cooperation, through the Organization of American States, is necessary to avoid such violations
of territorial sovereignty, see Jennifer J. Veloz, Comment, In the Clinton Era, Overturning
Alvarez-Machain and ExtraterritorialAbduction: How a Unified Western Hemisphere, Through
the OAS, Can Win the War on Drugs and Do It Legally, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 241
(1998).
"' See MLAT, supra note 118, S. TREATYDOc. No. 100-13 at iii, 27 I.L.M. at 445 (Letter
of Transmittal from President Reagan to the United States Senate).
'39 Id., S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13 at v, 27 I.L.M. at 446 (Letter of Submittal from Secretary
of State Shultz to President Reagan).
140 MLAT, supra note 118, art. 1, §1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13 at2,27 I.L.M. at 447; art.
2, §1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-13 at 2, 27 I.L.M. at 448.
'4' Id. S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13 at 1, 27 I.L.M. at 447 (emphasis added).
141 See id. art. 11, §2, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13 at 6, 27 I.L.M. at 450.
'4 See id. art. 18, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13 at 7, 27 I.L.M. at 450.
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United States drug czar Barry McCaffrey, United States Attorney General
Janet Reno, and Mexican Attorney General Jorge Madrazo Cuellar have held
several conferences in an attempt to control the damage caused to United
States-Mexico relations. McCaffrey announced in November 1998 that the
United States would provide X-ray machines and other technological
assistance to United States and Mexican customs officers on the border.'"
Madrazo, Reno, McCaffrey, and Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations
Rosario Green met in December 1998 at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the High
Level Contact Group on Drug Control (HLCG) to review the status of bilateral
cooperation. 45 Not surprisingly, one of the main topics was money laundering
and law enforcement. Although it is too soon to gauge the impact of these
meetings, there is reason to hope for better disclosure in the future." After
all, "[i]nternational cooperation is unavoidable and indispensable.' 47
C. International Law Violations
United States conduct in Operation Casablanca clearly violated several
principles of international law. "International law is part of [U.S.] law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction.... ,,48 International law has the character and quality of law, and
functions as both a restraint against arbitrary state action and a guide in
international relations. 49 Although sometimes it is assumed that states only
follow international law when convenient, this impression is mistaken. States
'44 See United States, Mexico Speak of Expanding Joint Anti-Drug Efforts, But Relations
Remain Strained, SOURCEMEX ECON. NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MExico, Nov. 18, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 8779152.
,41 See Embassy of Mexico Press Release, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Dec. 16, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7471941. The HLCG was established in 1996 by Presidents Zedillo and
Clinton to ensure continuous coordination and cooperation at the highest level in the war on
drugs. See id. In other words, it was established to prevent the very situation caused by
Operation Casablanca.
146 See Alice Ann Love, United States, Mexico Work to Mend Relations, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ONLINE, Dec. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23511760. Madrazo declared that "our
exchanges have more depth and are more satisfying," and McCaffrey presented a bundle of
documents several inches thick to show how much information was shared by the two countries
at the HLCG conference. Id.; see discussion supra note 82 and accompanying text.
147 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the UnitedNations, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992/93,
at 89, 99.
149 The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). This statement is the oft-quoted official
position of United States courts in applying principles of international law.
... See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, pt. I, ch. 1, Intro. Note.
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freely consider themselves bound by it and take it into account in their
international relations.150
There are two basic principles of international law that the United States
violated during Operation Casablanca: territorial sovereignty and pacta sunt
servanda, the principle that, generally, agreements of parties must be observed.
These principles are in the Charter of the Organization of American States,'
the United Nations Charter, 52 to which the United States is a signatory, and
'also the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.'53
Under international law, a state has sovereignty over its own territory.'54
As interpreted by United States courts, sovereignty implies a state's lawful and
exclusive control over its territory, and its authority to govern and apply law
there. 155 This attitude has been partly shaped by foreign protests to past United
States "extravagant and exorbitant exercises" of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 56
The OAS Charter, which was adopted by the United States in 1948, is based
on principles of mutual respect for and the sovereignty of each member
state.157  It also prohibits any state from committing unjust acts against
another.'5" It further states that no state may interfere in the affairs of
another'59 and that the territory of each state is inviolable. 60 Finally, the
0 See id.
' Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948,2 U.S.T. 2416, amended
by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Feb. 27, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 658 [hereinafter O.A.S. CHARTER].
352 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, pt. III, ch. 3, § 321 cmt. a.
114 See id. pt. II, ch. 1, § 206(a).
"' See id. § 206 cmt. b.
356 58 A.L.I. PROC. 262 (1981) (comments of Louis Henkin).
157 See CHARLES G. FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: THE INTER-
AMERICAN REGIONAL SYSTEM 3 (1963).
"' See O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 151, art. 11, 2 U.S.T. at 2419, amended by art. 5, 21
U.S.T. at 662. Article 11 provides: "The right of each State to protect itself and to live its own
life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another State." Id.
"9 See id. art. 15, 2 U.S.T. at 2419-20, amended by art. 5, 21 U.S.T. at 662. Article 18 sets
forth: "No State... has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever,
in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only
armed force, but also any other form of interference of attempted threat against the personality
of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements." Id.
'60 See id. art. 17,2 U.S.T. at 2420, amended by art. 5, 21 U.S.T. at 662. Article 17 provides:
"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military
occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatsoever." Id.
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Hypothetically, let us envision a situation in which a United States arms
dealer in San Diego has been smuggling guns to a drug cartel in Mexico.
Given Mexico's tough anti-gun laws (and very permissive gun purchase laws
in the United States), this situation is not far from an every day occurrence.'6 1
Mexican agents slip across the border and proceed to conduct a sting
operation. They ensnare the United States gun dealer and lure him south of the
border to Acapulco for the opening of a new resort. When the dealer arrives
in Mexico, he is promptly taken into custody and charged with violations of
Mexican law. While awaiting trial, he languishes in a Mexicanjail. Although
this scenario is unlikely, one can envision the United States reaction to such
cavalier disregard of American borders, especially if no United States law
enforcement entity was informed. Mexico has not sponsored such blatant
action since the Mexican-American War of the 1840s. Recall that Pancho
Villa was not a state-backed agent when he rode into Texas in 1916. The point
is simple: borders do matter and should be respected.
Operation Casablanca is not the only incident in which United States law
enforcement agents violated the territorial sovereignty of their neighbors. The
Jaffe case was an instance in which a Canadian citizen was kidnapped from his
Toronto apartment building in 1981 by two United States bounty hunters. 61
He was later convicted on land fraud charges and sentenced to thirty-five years
in prison.'" Similar to the Mexican reaction, the Canadian government
officially protested this violation of Canadian sovereignty and requested that
Jaffe be returned to Canada.165 Jaffe later was granted bail on new charges
(after the overturning of the land fraud charges) and escaped to Canada.66 The
161 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 (providing that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations").
162 See Marcus Gee, Mexico Awash in Tide of United States Weapons: Despite Gun Laws as
Strict as Canada 's, Cross-border Smuggling Has Created Deadly Problems for Officials and
Fearful Residents, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 3, 1998, at A25. Roberto Rodriguez, the
Mexican consul in Nogales, Arizona, on the border with Mexico, said, "It's a firearms
supermarket up here. [United States gun dealers] sell everything from shotguns to machine
pistols and it's almost impossible to control." Id. Mexican gun laws forbid most people from
owning handguns and also prohibit gun shops. See id.
"3 See Extraterritorial Application, supra note 46, at 395.
'64 See id.
165 See id.
66 See id. at 396.
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end result was that Jaffe became a fugitive from United States justice, and the
two bounty hunters were extradited to Canada where they were convicted of
kidnapping.
167
Clearly, such flagrant violations of territorial sovereignty do not create the
results hoped for. Casablanca is another example: millions of dollars in assets
frozen and dozens of indictments but at the cost of a foreign relations fiasco,
with the United States once again living up to its reputation as "bully of the
Americas." Some have tried to justify this course of action as resting on the
powers of the United States as a self-declared sovereign with the ability to
conduct itself as it chooses in both domestic and international matters.' 68
Another theory is that a state like Mexico might pretend to be angry, but in
truth is happy for the United States to come in and do its dirty work by
removing dangerous criminals. 69
The United States also violated the principle ofpacta sunt servanda. As
noted earlier, pacta sunt servanda is the principle that, generally, agreements
of parties must be observed. Every international agreement in force is binding
upon the parties to it. 7 0 Pacta sunt servanda lies at the very heart of the law
of international agreements and is perhaps the most important principle of
international law.'7 ' A state has a responsibility to other states for the breach
of its duties under international law and its agreements. 72 This is codified in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as follows: "Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith."' 73 Because respect for territorial sovereignty is found in two treaties to
which the United States is a signatory (the OAS Charter and the MLAT), the
167 See id.
68 See, e.g., Michael R. Pontoni, Comment, Authority of the United States to
Extraterritorially Apprehend and Lawfully Prosecute International Drug Traffickers and Other
Fugitives, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215, 239 (1990/1991). This argument is based partly on the
notion that the United States as a sovereign can apply extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction to acts
committed outside its borders but having an effect within its borders, and partly on the fact that
United States courts have construed themselves as not bound to follow the guidelines of the
United Nations Charter. See id. at 222, 230. This is so because the United Nations Charter is
not "self-executing" and does not have an executory clause. See id. at 230. The question of the
binding (or non-binding) nature of non-self-executing treaties is beyond the scope of this paper.
369 See Lowenfeld II, supra note 117, at 488.
370 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 321.
1'7 See id. § 321 cmt. a.
,72 See id. § 206 cmt. e.
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 2, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 33 1.
2000]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
United States failure to abide by this condition has resulted in a breach of those
treaties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the current attitude in the United States regarding treaty
commitments has been indifferent at best. 74 The recent congressional stance
in reaction to Operation Casablanca supports this observation. Money
laundering is a serious crime with ramifications throughout the global financial
network, and governments should not "permit the law to be manipulated to
render the free world ineffective in dealing with those who have no regard for
law.""' However, the United States and Mexico have negotiated a treaty, the
MLAT, that envisions exactly a Casablanca-type situation. The United States
should give it a chance to work. As Lowenfeld has aptly declared, "The
interrelation among statute, Constitution and treaty is, to put it charitably,
confusing. But the ultimate values of limited government transcend any given
triumph of law enforcement."' 76 Adhering to treaty obligations is crucial to
any state's ability to negotiate and obtain compliance with future treaties."'
In the future, the United States will hopefully exercise greater discretion when
enforcement of its domestic laws extends beyond its borders.
"u See Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 458,458 (1998) (noting a striking willingness in the United States to disregard existing treaty
obligations).
17' Abraham Sofaer, The International Law and Foreign Policy Implications of
Nonconsensual Extraterritorial Law EnforcementActivities 11, reprinted in Lowenfeld II, supra
note 117, at 487 (statement before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 8, 1989).
176 Lowenfeld I, supra note 103, at 893.
'" See Vagts, supra note 174, at 462 (arguing that a "reputation for playing fast and loose
with treaty commitments can only do harm to [the United States'] capacity to be a leader in the
post-Cold War period").
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